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ABSTRACT
We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and
income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross-national
dataset into two sub-samples: (i) colonies versus non-colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East-
West versus those aligned on a North-South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural
variances in these two sub-samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law
are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes.
Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect
on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are
not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.
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What are the fundamental determinants of the large income gaps that separate 
different regions of the world?  Are high incomes the result of good institutions, or is it 
economic wealth that enables high-quality institutions?  How does democracy affect 
economic development?  Is openness to international trade good for development? For 
democracy? For the quality of institutions?  What role do geographical constraints and 
advantages play in driving all these?  What are the relative contributions to patterns of 
global inequality of exogenous determinants such as geography versus man-made factors 
such as institutions?   
  
These are some of the most important questions in the social sciences and among 
the thorniest to resolve empirically.  An immediate difficulty has to do with measurement 
and quantification.  How are concepts such as “institutions” and “geography” to be 
operationalized?  In recent years, economists have developed a number of different 
proxies for these, which by now are quite common in the cross-country growth literature 
(even though they often baffle other social scientists).  The quality of institutions, for 
example, is typically measured using survey-based perceptions of expropriation risk or 
the rule of law.  Geography is typically quantified by looking at distance from the 
equator, an indicator of climate, or some measure of malaria risk.   
  
The far greater difficulty arises with ascertaining causality.  Each of the 
determinants listed above, with the possible exception of purely geographical variables, 
can be (and probably are) both a cause and an effect.  Simple OLS regressions that relate, 
say, institutional quality and trade to income levels are likely to yield seriously biased 
results if used to infer the causal impact of right-hand side variables on the left-hand side 
variable.  The standard solution to this conundrum in cross-national work has been to 
employ an instrumental-variable approach.  This entails finding a variable (the 
instrument) that (a) is exogenous; (b) is correlated with the endogenous variable for 
which it is instrumenting; and (c) does not influence the dependent variable through any 
channel other than the relevant endogenous variable.  Once such a variable is located, 
unbiased estimates of the causal effects can be recovered.   
  
This approach has yielded considerable progress in recent years.  Several papers 
in this line of work are particularly noteworthy.  Frankel and Romer (FR, 1999) have 
used a gravity trade equation to derive the geographical component of trade, which they 
then used as an instrument to estimate the effect of trade on the level of income.  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR, 2001) have used the mortality rate of early 
European colonists to derive an instrument for institutional quality and to estimate the   2
influence of institutions on incomes.  Sachs (2003) has used an ecologically-based 
determinant of malaria incidence to estimate the impact of geography.  Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi (RST, 2002) have combined the FR and AJR instruments to run 
a “horse race” among institutions, trade, and geography and to examine their relative 
significance in the determination of income.   
 
While the IV approach has paid off, it also has some drawbacks.  Most 
importantly, the requirements for an instrument to be valid (as discussed briefly above) 
are quite demanding.  In particular, it is difficult to come up with truly exogenous 
variables that also satisfy the exclusion restriction—i.e., indicators that can be argued to 
influence incomes solely through the determinant for which they are instrumenting.  
Consequently, the list of plausible instruments that can be used in this line of inquiry is 
extremely short (and the instruments mentioned in the previous paragraph come close to 
exhausting it).  This results in just-identified specifications, restricts the range of 
questions that can be posed, and raises interpretational difficulties.   
 
As a result, none of the previously mentioned papers can shed much light on the 
reverse causality running from income to institutions, trade, or public health. Doing so 
would require coming up with an instrumental variable for income--a variable that affects 
income but not any of its determinants.  Perhaps for obvious reasons, no-one has yet 
embarked on such an effort. Also, existing instruments do not allow us to distinguish, 
say, between economic and political institutions and gauge their respective contributions 
to economic performance.
2 There are simply not enough good instruments to answer 
these important questions.  In a similar vein, Dollar and Kraay (2003) have raised 
questions about the validity of using the AJR and FR instruments simultaneously in order 
to parse out the separate influences of trade and institutions on incomes, arguing that the 




Moreover, existing instruments for institutional quality and trade are correlated 
strongly with geographical variables and with human capital, raising interpretational 
questions about what is in fact being identified.  For example, Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001) suggest that the FR (1999) findings have more to do with the impact of geography 
on incomes than with the impact of trade on incomes.  Similarly, analysts like Sachs who 
think geography plays a key role would argue that the AJR (2001) instrument is a stand-
in for the historical impact of geography, and not for the quality of institutions 
bequeathed by colonial settlers.  Glaeser et al. (2004) have argued that settler mortality 
may simply capture the human capital of the European colonists, rather than early 
institutional strengths.  
                                                 
2 See however Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) which tries to unbundle two types of economic institutions, 
which they call property rights institutions and contracting institutions.  They use an IV strategy relying on 
colonial history. 
 
3 This is essentially the “weak instruments” problem in the context of multiple instruments.  RST (2002) 
argue that this is not a problem when the conventional measure of trade openness is used (as in RST 2000), 
but becomes one when an alternative measure (due to Alcala and Ciccone 2002) is substituted. 
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In this paper we pursue an alternative identification strategy which does not have 
these disadvantages.  We rely on a novel approach called Identification through 
Heteroskedasticity (IH). The IH method does not require an instrumental variable.  It 
achieves identification instead by exploiting plausible differences in the variances of 
error terms across sub-samples of the data.  To see the intuition behind the IH method, 
consider the pair of equations that describe the relationship between income (y) and 
institutional quality (I): 
 
(1)  y = β I + ε 
 
(2)  I = θ y + ν     
 
where ε and ν are the random shocks to the income and institutions equations 
respectively.  This is an unidentified system.  The usual IV trick would be to find a 
variable that enters the institutions equation (2) but not equation (1).  But suppose we can 
split our data into two sub-samples A and B such that the variance of the shock to the 
institutions equation ( ) is larger in sub-sample A than it is in sub-sample B.  This helps 
us uncover the structural parameters of the model without an instrumental variable.  What 
the hypothesized difference in shocks in the two sub-samples means is that the scatter of 
observations in (y, I) space in sub-sample A is aligned more closely along the income 
equation (1) than it is in sub-sample B.  In the limit, if the variance of ν is infinite in sub-
sample A, the scatter of observations in that sub-sample would trace out the income 
equation (1) perfectly.  More generally, as long as relative variances of the structural 
shocks differ across sub-samples, this difference provides us with a “probabilistic 




Somewhat more formally, the reason that the system of equations (1)-(2) is not 
identified is that we need to estimate four unknowns,  and  while the data 
yield estimates of only three moments, var(y), var(I), and cov(y, I).  Suppose now that we 
could split our data into two sub-samples (j=A, B) with identical parameters β and θ, but 
different variances for the random shocks ( and  ).  The two sub-
samples now yield two separate variance-covariance matrices and six moments, which 
are enough to solve for the six unknowns ( , ).  In other words, 
splitting the sample adds two new unknowns (two additional variances), while generating 
three bits of useful information, and therefore identifies the system.  Moreover, if our 
equations contain truly exogenous variables (such as distance from the equator), the 
system becomes over-identified. That in turn enables us to insert additional endogenous 
regressors. We shall describe our procedures in greater detail in the next section. 
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The IH method relies on two critical identification assumptions.  First, the 
parameters of interest (i.e., β and θ in the above example) are identical in the different 
sub-samples.  We consider this particular assumption to be innocuous, since it has long 
been the maintained assumption in the cross-national literature, where it is standard 
practice to pool the data for all countries in the sample. The second, and more critical   4
identifying assumption is that we can split the data into sub-samples with different 
relative variances of the structural shocks.  This is where we need to rely on prior 
assumptions and make plausible guesses.   
 
In this paper we use two different splits.  First we distinguish between countries 
that have been colonized by European powers and countries that have not.  While both 
sets of countries exhibit wide variance in income levels (RST 2002), the (unconditional) 
variance of incomes (and of other endogenous regressors) is typically larger in the non-
colonized group than it is in the colonized group.  Our maintained assumption here is that 
colonization is a homogenizing experience that reduces the variance of shocks to which 
countries have been subjected.  Countries that have not been colonized by European 
powers have been open to a much wider array of influences and ruler types.  Note that 
making this distinction between the two groups is not inconsistent with the assumption 
that the parameters of interest are stable across the two groups.  Non-colonized countries 
may have had more heterogeneous outcomes in institutional arrangements (due to 
exogenous shocks), but that does not imply that the impact of institutions on incomes, or 
vice versa, is any different in that sample.     
 
The second split we use relies on an argument made by Jared Diamond (1997) 
regarding how geography interacts with technology transfer.  Diamond points out that it 
is easier for new seed varieties and other agricultural technologies to migrate on an East-
West axis than on a North-South axis.  The reason is that moving in the North-South 
direction entails traversing different ecological and climatic zones, with attendant loss in 
the suitability and adaptability of agricultural innovations.  Hence we split our sample 
between countries that are located in continents aligned on an East-West axis (Eurasian 
countries) versus those in continents aligned on a North-South axis (Africa and the 
Americas).  Once again, the idea is that the relative magnitude of structural shocks will 
differ in the two samples without necessarily altering the parameters of interest.  In 
particular, following Diamond we expect the variance of income shocks to be larger in 
the North-South sample than in the East-West sample.  
 
One important feature of our methodology is that if both splits of the data are 
valid, then the coefficients should be the same across specifications. We perform this test 
and are unable to reject the overidentifying restrictions. Not only are the point estimates 
not statistically different, but our two splits produce remarkably similar coefficients.  
Finally, another advantage of our procedure is that because all the variances and 
coefficients are estimated we can compute a variance decomposition and evaluate the 
respective contributions of the explanatory variables to explaining the observed variance 
in outcomes. 
 
We apply this approach to analyze the joint determination of four endogenous 
variables: incomes (GDP per capita), economic institutions (rule of law), political 
institutions (democracy), and integration (trade).  Aside from these endogenous variables, 
our specifications include distance from the equator, population, and land area as 
exogenous regressors.  Note that in contrast with the previous literature, we are able to   5
estimate the impact of income levels on the other endogenous variables.  Returning to the 
questions we posed at the opening of this paper, we find:   
 
1.  Democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the 
latter has a much stronger impact on incomes (both statistically and 
quantitatively). Using the colony split, the estimated coefficient on rule of law is 
smaller than the OLS estimate–exactly as we would have expected in the presence 
of feedback from income. 
 
2.  Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels after we control for 
geography and institutions.  
 
3.  Countries located far from the equator are richer, although this effect is smaller 
when we use the geographical split. Interestingly, because distance to the equator 
has a sizable impact on our endogenous variables, it ends up explaining an 
important proportion of the variance in incomes.  Using the colony/non-colony 
split, the proportion of the variance that is ultimately explained by distance from 
the equator is 20 percent. 
 
4.  Having a large land area or population is bad (in general) for economic 
performance. Even though the estimated coefficients for area are highly 
statistically significant, country size explains less than 7 percent of the variance in 
income.   
 
5.  Turning to the determinants of institutions, we find that higher income produces 
better institutions (but our estimates here are not terribly significant). This is true 
both for democracy and for rule of law. Income explains a little less than 10 
percent of the variation in institutions. 
 
6.  Rule of law and democracy are generally mutually reinforcing and they tend to 
feed on each other.  Greater rule of law produces more democracy, and vice versa.  
But the effects are not strong: the estimates are sometimes insignificant and in 
most cases they explain less than 10 percent of the variation. 
 
7.  Trade openness is good for the rule of law but bad for democracy. Trade’s 
estimated (negative) impact on democracy is very significant, while its estimated 
(positive) impact on the rule of law is significant in one specification and 
insignificant in the other. The asymmetric effect of trade on economic and 
political institutions is one of our most striking findings. It is also a very robust 
result, surviving all the specifications we ran. Regarding the variance 
decomposition, however, openness contributes very little to the determination of 
institutions (less than 10 percent). 
 
8.  Distance from the equator has a significant effect on democracy and rule of law, 
and explains between 8 and 17 percent of the variation in democracy and between 
22 and 40 percent of the variation of rule of law.   6
 
9.  Income has a positive but small impact on the degree of openness. Democracy 
and rule of law have negligible effects on openness. The variance decomposition 
indicates a very small explanatory power of institutions on openness (less than 2 
percent). 
 
10. Finally, the most important variables determining the degree of openness are 
those related to geography: distance from the equator, land area and population.  
Taken together, they explain more that 50 percent of the variation in openness in 
the sample. 
 
These results are generally quite robust to changes in the underlying 
specifications and the use of one split versus the other. We estimated the same system of 
equations using two different splits, and various different measures of openness, 
democracy, and institutions.  In all these estimations the coefficients turned out to be 
relatively stable. In comparing our preferred specification to the ones from the sensitivity 
analysis, we find that coefficients that are significant in the former usually are also 
significant in the latter, with the same sign. The few cases in which the coefficients 
reverse signs are those where the coefficients are badly estimated (with large standard 
errors). However, we never found a single case in which the hypothesis of parameter 
stability could be rejected.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section II presents our methodology in 
greater detail.  Section III presents and discusses the results.  Section IV discusses 
robustness and other issues.  Section V concludes. 
 
 
II. Solving the estimation problem 
 
One of the thorniest problems in applied work is the presence of simultaneous-
equations bias. As we discussed in the introduction, the coefficients in equations (1) and 
(2) cannot be consistently estimated without the help of instrumental variables, which 
requires us to locate exogenous variables that belong in one of the equations but not the 
other. In particular, to estimate the impact of institutions on income through instrumental 
variables necessitates that there exist a variable (z) that is correlated with institutions but 
not with the innovation to the income equation: 
 
 








This is an exclusion restriction that allows us to estimate the coefficient in the first 
equation (β ).  However, there are several applications in which this assumption cannot be 
imposed, and hence there does not exist a plausible instrument that can solve the problem 
of estimation.  Furthermore, IV allows us to estimate one equation (the income equation 
in this example) but does not help us estimate the other (the institutions equation). 
   7
In this paper we use an alternative method–Identification through 
Heteroskedasticity (IH)–to deal with the simultaneous equations issues that are likely to 
be present in the joint determination of institutions, openness, and income. In this section 
we present the intuition of the procedure for a general multinomial system of equations 
assuming that all variables are endogenous. This is done to simplify the exposition.  The 
more general case, including exogenous variables, is discussed below. 
 
Assume that there is a set of N endogenous variables denoted by X , and assume 
that the “true” model (which is known as the structural form) is denoted as 
 
(3)  ε + = c X A  
 
where the matrix A is the matrix that characterizes the contemporaneous relationships 
among the endogenous variables.  In general it is assumed that the diagonal of the matrix 
is equal to 1 (which is known as the normalization assumption).  Our application is cross 
sectional and lags are not included in the specification.  The constant terms are denoted 
by the vector c. The residuals (ε ) are known as the structural shocks and in most 
macroeconomic and development applications they are assumed to be uncorrelated. In 
other words: 
 






































The reduced form of the model is given by  
 
(5)    ε
1 1 − − + = A c A X
 
with the reduced form residuals defined as 
 
    ε η
1 − = A
 
Although the structural form cannot be estimated, the reduced form can. In this particular 
case, we can estimate the reduced form constant terms and the covariance matrix of the 
reduced form residuals. In fact, these are the only statistics that can be obtained from the 
data.  
 
The question of identification has to do with whether the structural coefficients 
can be recovered from the reduced form estimates. In general, the answer is no. For 
instance, the covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks is 
 
(6)   
' 1 1 ) var( ) var(
− − Σ = = A A X η
   8
Note that in a system with N endogenous variables the matrix A has   terms, and the 
covariance matrix of the structural form residuals has N terms–which accounts for a total 
of   unknowns. On the other hand, the covariance matrix of the reduced form 
residuals provides 
2 N
( 1 + N N )
()
2
1 + N N
 equations–half of what is needed to solve the problem of 
estimation. This is indeed the standard problem of identification in simultaneous 
equations models. The number of reduced form coefficients–or moments that can be 
estimated from the reduced form–is smaller than the number of unknowns–or structural 
parameters. 
 
The idea of identification through heteroskedasticity is to increase the number of 
available moments or equations such that the problem of identification can be solved.  So 
let us assume that the sample can be split in two (s1 and s2) in a manner that satisfies the 
following properties: 
 


























This structure only adds the assumption that the data has heteroskedasticity. All 
other aspects of the structure remain identical. This model assumes that the constant (c) 
and the set of coefficients on the endogenous matrix (A) are the same across the cross-
section. The only difference is in the variance of the residuals of the structural equations 
across the two sub-samples. This change implies that the reduced form covariance matrix 
of each sub-sample now provides  ()
2
1 + N N
 equations. The order condition requires that 
the number of knowns be larger than or equal to the number of unknowns. The rank 
condition specifies that the knowns (or equations) have to be linearly independent.  In 
standard linear systems of equations we test for the rank condition given that the order 
condition is satisfied. In other words, we count the number of equations and the number 
of unknowns. If the number of equations is larger than the unknowns we compute the 
rank of the matrix of the system. If that rank is larger than the number of unknowns then 
the system of equations has at least as many linearly independent equations as the number 
of unknowns; and therefore there is a solution.  
 
In our case this is exactly what we can do. We assume the heteroskedasticity in 
the data, and count whether or not there are more moments in the data than the number of 
coefficients that have to be estimated. Assuming that such a condition is satisfied, then 
we can proceed and test if the estimates of the structural equation variances are different 
across sub-samples–which is equivalent to the rank condition. 
   9
It is important to highlight the identifying assumption in this procedure – the fact 
that the structural shocks are uncorrelated. If the shocks were correlated and there is no 
restriction on the variation of such covariance, then every heteroskedastic regime adds as 
many equations as unknowns, and the problem of identification could not be solved. 
Observe that there is a crucial difference between parameter stability and the covariance 
assumption. Parameter stability can be tested if there is enough regimes. The reason is 
that it can be estimated assuming that parameters are stable and check the overidentifying 
restrictions. The zero correlation assumption, on the other hand, cannot be tested. This is 
the identifying assumption, and therefore it is maintained. In our application, given that 
we are including income, institutional variables, openness, and geographical variables we 
believe that we are considering enough variables such that no additional variables are 
needed.   
 
Finally, it should be obvious that heteroskedasticity can be combined with other 
assumptions (such as exclusion restrictions), in which case the system of equations will 
become overidentified. In our application, several of the variables in X can be considered 
exogenous (for example, geographical variables), and therefore, the problem of 
identification can be lessened. 
 
The literature on identification through heteroskedasticity is based on the original 
intuition provided by Philip Wright (1928). Wright indicates that we can solve the 
problem of identification if instead of moving the mean (which is the standard IV 
methodology) we find a variable that increases the variance of one of the equations to 
infinity. In other words, if the volatility of the innovations to the demand schedule is 
infinitely large in comparison to the volatility of the innovations in the supply schedule, 
effectively we only observe movements due to innovations to the demand, and therefore 
we can estimate the supply schedule directly. This is known today as “near identification” 
(Fisher 1976).  
 
Recently this methodology has been revisited and extended to time series and 
panel data. The most important innovation of this new literature is that the original 
intuition of taking the variance to infinity has been shown to be not required.  It is enough 
to find a shift in the variances of the structural shocks that changes their relative 
importance. Leamer (1981) pointed out in the standard supply and demand framework 
that the admissible coefficients belong to a hyperbola. If the variances of the shocks shift, 
then the hyperbola rotates and the pivotal point is the pair of true coefficients. See 
Rigobon (2003) and Lewbel (2004) for the formal derivation.
4 
                                                 
4 Regarding the development of the theory in the times series literature see Sentana (1992), Sentana and 
Fiorentini (2001), and Rigobon (2003a). For applications see in Caporale, et. al. (2002a), Rigobon (2002a), 
Rigobon and Sack (2003a). In these papers the heteroskedasticity is modeled as a GARCH process and the 
authors use the heteroskedasticity in the time series mainly as a statistical method to achieve identification.  
See Rigobon (2002b 2003b), Rigobon and Sack (2003b), Caporale teal. (2002b) for applications where the 
heteroskedasticity is described by regime shifts. In these papers economic events are used to determine the 
regimes. Additionally, see Rigobon and Sack (2002) and Evans and Lyons (2003) for applications of the 
identification through heteroskedasticity to event study estimation.  Few applications have been applied to 
panel data in the literature. Hogan and Rigobon (2003) apply the method to a very large panel data to 




In this section we apply the methodology described above to our problem. We are 
interested in estimating the relationships among income, political institutions 
(democracy), economic institutions (rule of law), openness, distance from the equator, 
land area, and population.
5 We assume that the last three are exogenous to the first four 
allowing us to have a large set of overidentifying restrictions.  So our system includes 
four endogenous variables (income, democracy, rule of law, openness) and three 
exogenous variables (distance from equator, area, population).  We allow the equation for 
each of the endogenous variables to include all the exogenous variables as well as the 
(other) endogenous variables.   
 
  The data come from the standard sources: Penn World Tables and World 
Development Indicators for economic data, Polity IV for indicators of democracy and 
constraint on the executive, and Knack and Keefer (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (2002) for 
the rule of law.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables included in most of the 
specifications.   
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
    Num Obs.  Average  Std. Deviation 
Distance from the Equator  disteq  208  25.0  16.8 
Country  Area  area  162 315534.2 902546.9 
Openness copen  170  72.9  43.6 
Population pop  192  29.3  113.2 
Openness (PWT)  pwtopen  171  74.0  42.7 
GDP percapita  gdppc  165  7358.9  7541.9 
Democracy democ  161  0.5  19.1 
Constraints on the executive  xconst  161  0.1  18.7 
Rule of Law (Kaufmann et al.)  rulelawkkz  81  -0.3  0.9 
Rule of Law 80s (KK)  rulelaw80  126  3.1  1.5 
Rule of Law 90s (KK)  rulelaw90  131  3.8  1.3 
 
 
Vella (2003) also use heteroskedasticity to estimate the returns to education. They use a nonparametric 
model to describe the heteroskedasticity as a function of the regressors. Broda and Weinstein (2003) use the 
inequality constraints together with the heteroskedasticity to estimate the elasticities of substitution in 
models of trade to evaluate the gains from variety in the same spirit of Leamer’s (1981). Pattillo, Poirson, 
and Ricci (2003) use the IH method to identify the impact of external debt on growth. Hviding and Ricci 
(2003) investigate the impact of official reserves on exchange rate volatility. These last two papers use the 
regime shift methodology of times series to obtain the different groups in the population. 
 
5 We include land area and population primarily because these have been frequently used as determinants 
of openness. Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that these also belong in the income equation when openness 
is used as a determinant. 
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One important ingredient in the identification strategy (IH) is the split of the data 
in several groups. We assume that there are two groups in the sample in terms of their 
variances of the structural shocks.  The assumption that the same A applies to both sub-
samples is innocuous, insofar as it is an implicit assumption made whenever we estimate 
the system by OLS or IV by pooling the two sub-samples.  We use two criteria to split 
our sample in two different ways.  First, we distinguish between countries that were 
colonized by Europeans and countries that were not.  We rely here on the argument that 
colonization has been, relatively speaking, a homogenizing experience insofar as it has 
implied rule by a few metropolitan centers and the adoption of practices and institutions 
imposed from these centers.  Everything else being the same, this historical experience 
should have reduced the variance of the structural shocks to which colonized countries 
have been subjected to, compared to non-colonized countries.  Countries that have been 
occupied by Europeans for a relatively short period of time (fewer than 25 years) are not 
included in the colonized group.
6  Second, we split the data according to the way the 
continents are aligned, distinguishing between horizontal and vertical continents. Here we 
rely on an argument made by Jared Diamond (1997) regarding how geography interacts 
with technology transfer.  Diamond points out that it is easier for new seed varieties and 
other agricultural technologies to migrate on an East-West axis than on a North-South 
axis.  The reason is that moving in the North-South direction entails traversing different 
ecological and climatic zones, with attendant loss in the suitability and adaptability of 
agricultural innovations.  Hence we split our sample between countries that are located in 
continents aligned on an East-West axis (Eurasian countries) versus those in continents 
aligned on a North-South axis (Africa and the Americas).  
 
In the appendix we present the list of countries in each of the splits. Under the 
colony split we have 70 countries that have not being colonized by Europeans for a 
significant period of time, and 168 countries that have been. We do not have information 
about institutions, openness, etc. for all of them and the final sample constitutes 53 
colonized countries and 33 not colonized countries. The geographical orientation split has 
fewer countries in the sample (Oceania is excluded). We have 98 countries that belong to 
continents that are horizontally aligned (Eurasia) and 59 countries in continents that are 
vertically aligned (Africa and the Americas). The final sample with all the data contains 
43 countries in each sub-sample. 
 
 
III.1 Openness, institutions, and income with OLS 
 
As a first step, we show the results when the income equation is estimated using 
OLS without instruments. We estimate the following specification: 
 
                                                 
6 Our variable requires that the colonization take place before the beginning of the 20
th century, and that the 
country be occupied for more than 25 years. We have also employed an alternative colonization variable 
that is set to one if Europeans colonized the country for short periods of time, at any time before world war 
one. The results are almost unaffected by the change in the split and therefore are not presented.  These 
results are available upon request.  
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  pop area disteq open irol idem y 6 5 4 3 2 1 α α α α α α + + + + + =  
 
where y, idem, irol, open, disteq, area, and pop are log output, democratic institutions, 
economic institutions (rule of law), log of openness (trade/GDP), distance from the 
equator (which is divided by 100), log of area, and log of population. This is the 
benchmark to which our estimates are going to be compared. We normalize each variable 
by its standard deviation in the whole sample to facilitate evaluation of the quantitative 
significance of the estimated coefficients.  
 
The results of estimating the OLS on the full equation are summarized in Table 2 
(t-statistics are reported under the coefficient estimates).  
Table 2: Income Equation: OLS estimates 
 Idem Irol Open  DistEq  Area Pop 
y 0.187 0.539 0.035  0.185  0.185 -0.151 
 2.3 5.4 0.3  2.0  2.0 -1.8 
 
The first coefficient indicates that an improvement in democratic institutions improves 
income significantly. The second estimate shows that an improvement in economic 
institutions – measured by the rule of law – also increases the income level, with a larger 
impact than democratic institutions. In this regression openness is not significant. This 
result appears when in the OLS regression several measures of institutions are included in 
the specification. Regarding the effect of geography, distance from the equator is 
associated with an improvement in the income levels, larger countries have higher 
incomes, and countries with large populations have smaller income levels (this last one is 
only marginally significant). 
 
Instrumental variables versions of such a specification have been reported in work 
by AJR (2001), FR (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003), RST (2002), Dollar and Kraay 
(2002), Alcala and Ciccone (2003), and Sachs (2003).  Generally, these results point to an 
important causal impact of institutional quality, with all studies that have explicitly 
considered the role of institutions finding a strong effect.  But the causal role played by 
trade and geography still remains controversial.  For example, RST (2002) finds no 
significant role for trade once institutional quality is controlled, and AJR (2001), Easterly 
and Levine (2003), and RST (2002) find only an indirect effect of geography (through 
institutional quality).   
 
As we discussed earlier, IV estimates are subject to questions having to do with the 
plausibility and quality of the instruments selected.  Moreover, none of these earlier 
studies is able to distinguish between economic and political institutions, and none can 
examine the full set of interactions among the endogenous variables.  That is where the 
advantages of the current approach lie.   
 
III.2 IH  estimation 
 
Our approach identifies the relationship among the endogenous variables not 
through instrumentation but by appealing to heteroskedasticity in the data.  Because   13
several of the variables under analysis (all the geography ones) are exogenous to income, 
institutions, and openness, we can impose some exclusion restrictions on the system.  
These improve the estimation, and can be used to test for overidentifying restrictions. In 
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where the pre-multiplying matrix is A, and where as before y, idem, irol, open, disteq, 
area, and pop denote output, democratic institutions, economic institutions (rule of law), 
openness, distance to the equator, area, and population, respectively. In the estimation we 
allow for different constant terms across the splits in the data. 
 
As in the simple example, we assume that the covariance of the structural 
residuals is diagonal; in other words, these residuals truly reflect independent innovations 
to each of the observed variables. Observe that in matrix A we have imposed the 
assumption that distance, area, and population are exogenous to income, institutions, and 
openness–the coefficients of the lower-matrix a  to   are all set equal to zero. 
Moreover, we allow interrelationships among these three exogenous variables through 
the coefficients  ,  , and  , but with the assumption that distance from the equator 
is the most exogenous one, and population the least exogenous. In other words, we allow 
population to be a function of distance from equator and area, and area to be a function of 
distance from equator.  
51 74 a
65 a 75 a 76 a
 
As was mentioned before we use two splits to estimate the model using the 
heteroskedasticity across the sub-samples. Both splits assume that the differences across 
groups are concentrated on their second moments and not on their A-matrix coefficients. 
In other words, our assumption is that the variances change but the coefficients in matrix 
A do not. One advantage of the IH methodology is that the parameter stability assumption 
can be tested. In our particular application this is best done by comparing the estimates 
from the different splits of the data.    
 
The parameters of interest are the endogenous coefficients (matrix A), the 
structural variances in each of the regimes, and the intercepts. All of our estimation is 
performed by GMM, and the iteration process for convergence is as follows:  
   14
1.  Given the parameters (matrix A, the structural variances, and intercepts) We 
compute the structural residuals in each regime 
  [  ]
' pop area  disteq  open  irol  idem  y  A  i  ×   =  η    
2.  The identifying assumption is that the covariance terms of the structural shocks 
are zero. We compute these moment conditions for each regime and each pair of 
variables.  
3.  Finally, we minimize the moment conditions searching for the intercepts, 
variances and contemporaneous coefficients.  
 
Note that in the construction of the moments we are conditioning on the split (this 
is not estimated, but assumed). An alternative would be to assume that countries belong 
to two different types differentiated only by their standard deviation. We could estimate 
that model where we do not have to commit to any ex-ante split of the data. This 
procedure would use the heteroskedasticity in the data as statistical means to solve the 
problem of identification. Although a significant part of the literature using 
heteroskedasticity – specially the one in which ARCH and GARCH models are fitted – is 
along this line, we believe that using an economic reason behind the identification has 
several advantages: First, we understand what the split is achieving and why. Second, 
because we have economic reasons to believe that the split changes the second moments 
but not the first moments or the contemporaneous coefficients we feel more comfortable 
with the outcome of the methodology and the assumption that the parameters are stable. 
Finally, using economic reasoning to construct the split, instead of random differences, 
eliminates some of the mysterious aspect of the identification.   
 
The first question that arises is how different are the two sub-samples under these 
splits? Are the means statistically different? Are the second moments?  The following 
two tables answer these questions.  Table 3 shows the estimated constant terms (c’s)—the 
structural intercepts—derived using the GMM procedure.  
 
Table 3: Differences in means across sub-samples  
    Y  Idem Irol  Open  DistEq  Area Pop 
    s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2  s1  S2 s1 s2 s1 s2 S1 s2 
Colony  Mean  5.30 5.20 1.28 1.42 -5.1 -5.1 14.67 14.77 1.01 2.52 6.30 5.28 7.01 7.54 
  StDev 1.72 1.73 2.25 2.26 2.01 2.03  0.96  0.98  0.09 0.12 0.22 0.46 0.60 0.58 
     0.04  0.05  0.01    0.07   9.99  2.01  0.63 
Geog. 
orientation 
Mean  5.99 5.81 4.07 4.01 -6.2 -6.0 15.71 15.15 2.22 0.95 5.61 6.43 7.39 6.51 
  StDev 1.90 1.81 2.50 2.41 2.29 2.18  0.97  0.92  0.14 0.10 0.35 0.19 0.50 0.52 
     0.07  0.02  0.06    0.42   7.64  2.04  1.22 
 
For each split and variable, the first entry is the mean in sub-sample one (s1) and 
the second entry is the mean in the other sub-sample (s2). Below each mean we show the 
standard deviation of the mean and the t-statistic associated with the test for the equality 
of the means. As can be seen, the two sub-samples reveal no differences in means with 
respect to our four endogenous variables--income, democracy, rule of law, and openness.  
This result holds for both of our splits.  Any significant difference in means across sub-  15
samples is confined to some of our exogenous variables (distance from the equator and 
land area).   
 
Our methodology relies on the assumption that second moments are statistically 
different across the sub-samples generated by our splits.  In Table 4 we show the 
differences in the variances of all seven variables across the sub-samples. As before, 
these are the variances of the structural shocks after the model has been estimated using 
GMM. Remember that the identification requires heteroskedasticity of the structural 
shocks and not of the reduced form shocks.   
 
As before, the first row for each split is the estimated standard deviation of the 
variable of interest; the second row is the standard deviation of this estimate; and the last 
row is the standard t-test for equality between the latter standard deviations. As can be 
seen, there are important differences here. In about half of the cases the standard 
deviations across the two sub-samples are statistically different. It is this feature of the 
data that enables us to estimate the coefficients using heteroskedasticity. If it were the 
case that second moments are not statistically different across splits identification would 
remain a hopeless task.    
 
Table 4: Differences in variance across sub-samples  
    Y  Idem Irol Open  DistEq  Area Pop 
    s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2 
Colony  σ  0.49 0.18 0.79 0.21 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.47 0.94 0.71 0.60 0.58 
  StDev 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.15 
     2.74  3.36  0.24  0.12  0.20  0.84  0.10 
Geog.  
orientation 
σ    0.19 0.56 0.34 0.78 0.37 0.51 0.32 0.31 0.78 0.39 0.96 0.83 0.66 0.34 
  StDev 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.08 
     2.69  2.24  0.93  0.10  2.07  0.43  1.91 
 
The results when the data are organized according to the geography split (shown 
in the bottom panel in each table) produce very similar results regarding means and 
standard deviations. In general, there are no large differences in the means, but significant 
disparities in second moments.  
 
  We are now ready to discuss the results of interest.  The estimates of matrix A 
using the colony variable to split the data are shown in Table 5; the estimates using 
geographical orientation are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of A matrix: Colony split 
 Y  Idem  Irol  Open  DistEq  Area  Pop 
Income    0.233 0.243 -0.360 0.245 -0.209 -0.105 
    1.64 1.88 4.02 2.38 3.68 1.57 
Democracy  0.433  -0.392  -0.294  0.267  -0.175  -0.179 
  1.04    0.88 2.24 1.96 1.70 2.51 
Rule of Law  0.198  0.432    0.316  0.228  0.146  0.086 
 1.69  2.96    3.40  1.91  1.84  1.27 
Openness  0.452 0.009 -0.052    -0.274 -0.138 -0.550   16
 2.60  0.07  0.19    1.82  2.35  8.21 
 
Table 6: Estimates of A matrix: Geographical orientation split 
 Y  Idem  Irol  Open  DistEq  Area  Pop 
Income    0.034 0.739 -0.179 -0.014 -0.235 0.065 
   0.32  9.89  2.03  0.19  3.17  1.03 
Democracy  0.145  0.254  -0.358  0.121  0.068  -0.460 
  0.61  1.60  2.47  0.89  0.85  4.57 
Rule of Law  0.129  0.099  0.177  0.720  -0.127  0.057 
  0.78 0.58    1.21  4.06  2.53 0.54 
Openness  0.033 -0.034 0.035    -0.127 -0.081 -0.677 
  0.26 0.27 0.26    0.93  1.19 11.20 
 
In both Tables we present only the equations for income, democracy, rule of law, 
and openness. The equations for distance from the equator, area, and population are not 
presented as they are not of interest. Each table is organized as follows: The first equation 
is the income equation, which is a function of the other six variables. Each entry presents 
the point estimate and the t-stat. The coefficients in the table are the coefficients of the  
matrix multiplied by -1, so, they have the same signs as if we had run them on the right 
hand side, instead of on the left hand side. This is just for ease of presentation of the 
results and to simplify the discussion and comparison between these estimates and those 
form OLS. The second equation shows the determination of democratic institutions as a 
function of the other six variables, and so forth. All the variables have been normalized 
by their standard deviations and therefore the point estimates are comparable and have 
the same interpretation as those from Table 2. 
 
Before proceeding to interpret each equation it is important to point out the 
stability of the coefficients across the two splits of the data. Remember that the set of 
countries included in one of the splits is different from that included in the other. Hence, 
the grouping cuts the data from two very different perspectives, and still the estimates are 
close–not only statistically but also in magnitude. We can see this in a number of ways.   
 
First, statistically speaking, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the coefficient 
estimates are the same across the two splits; the F-test has a p-value of 0.14.  Second, 
notice that the signs of the coefficients across the two tables are relatively consistent. For 
example, except for the non-significant coefficients the signs always agree across the two 
specifications.  Third, the coefficients that are significant in one split are likely to be 
significant in the other or to be insignificant but of the same sign. For instance, in the first 
split there are 14 coefficients that are significant or borderline significant (t-stats larger 
than 1.80). From these coefficients, 6 have the same sign and are also significant in the 
second split, and only one has a different sign.  That last coefficient is badly estimated 
and hence it is not statistically different from the coefficient estimated with the first split.  
Finally, the point estimates are close coefficient by coefficient. This strong robustness of 
the coefficient will be further highlighted below when we return to the sensitivity 
analysis, but as can be seen, the results seem to be quite robust so far. 
 
We proceed equation by equation for the interpretation of the coefficients. The 
first equation in both tables summarizes the determinants of income. We find, in line with   17
the existing literature, that the rule of law has a strong positive effect on income 
(although the estimated coefficient is only borderline significant with the colony split). 
Distance from the equator has a positive and significant effect in the first split, but an 
insignificant effect in the second split. Area and population enter significantly, although 
they have different signs from the OLS regressions – in fact, these coefficients are 
statistically different from those reported in Table 2.  Trade openness has a significant 
and negative effect on incomes in both splits.  Note, however, that the estimated 
coefficient on openness is not statistically different from that in the OLS specification, 
mainly because the OLS coefficient is badly estimated.  When only one of the two types 
of institutions is included in the OLS regression openness becomes significant, but when 
both are included the effect of openness disappears.  So, the small effect is in part due to 
an aspect that has not been analyzed in the literature before.  Finally, democracy enters 
with a positive sign in the income equation, but is (borderline) significant only with the 
colony split.  
 
A standard result in the literature on institutions is that the estimated coefficient 
on institutions typically increases significantly when the income equation is estimated 
using IV rather than OLS (with settler mortality as an instrument for example).  One 
explanation for this is the presence of errors-in-variables, which the instrumentation 
presumably corrects.  Certainly this is a possibility; however, another potential reason for 
the IV coefficient to be larger than the OLS coefficient is that the instrument is invalid – 
i.e., that settler mortality enters the income equation directly.  
 
We cannot directly compare our results with the standard IV results because the 
literature using mortality as instrument only includes one type of institution (rule or law 
or a measure of expropriation) and we use two. Therefore, just for this discussion we re-
estimated the model eliminating the democracy variable. First, the OLS estimates are: 
 
 Irol  Open  DistEq  Area  Pop 
y  0.374 0.074 0.447  -0.211 0.105 
  4.80 0.74 5.78  2.22  1.09 
 
This shows the usual result in the growth literature – the significant impact of rule 
of law and distance from the equator in explaining income differences in OLS 
specifications. If we apply the IH estimator to this data using the colony split, the results 
are as follows: 
 
 Y  Irol  Open  DistEq  Area  Pop 
Income    0.161  0.321 0.528 -0.085 0.185 
   2.14  1.98  8.10  1.44  2.00 
Rule of Law  0.136  0.064  0.509  0.155  -0.150 
  1.18  0.46  6.10  2.07  1.93 
Openness  -0.148 0.152    -0.023 -0.432 -0.396 
  0.95 1.54    0.24  6.96 9.60 
 
Notice that the coefficient on the rule of law is statistically significant, but it is half of the 
OLS estimate. Also observe that the feedback coefficient (income on rule of law) is 
positive and hence the OLS coefficient should be biased upwards.    18
 
We now turn our attention to the determinants of the democratic institutions. 
Although some of the results in the income equation are known, very little work has been 
done to ascertain empirically how institutions are affected by income, the degree of 
openness, etc. We find that income has a positive (but statistically insignificant) effect on 
democratic institutions. We find that rule of law has a (marginally) significant coefficient 
in the democracy equation when the geography split is used, but this coefficient is 
negative and not significant when the colony split is used. There is a belief in the 
literature that institutions of different kinds reinforce each other and some of our results 
are suggestive of that. Third, and most strikingly, we find that openness is bad for 
democracy. This result is robust to the split (and even to changes in the definition of 
openness and of democratic institutions, as we discuss below). The effects are large and 
statistically significant. Distance from the equator has a positive impact on democratic 
institutions, although the effect is significant in only one of the specifications. The size of 
the country (measured as its area) has no impact on the quality of its democracy, while 
countries with larger populations are less democratic on average. This last effect is highly 
significant. 
 
The results in the rule of law equation show some differences. On the one hand, 
income improves the quality of rule of law in the same way as it does for democracy – 
although here the point estimate is larger and more significant. Additionally, better 
democracy improves the rule of law. The feedback effects in this case are larger and more 
significant than in the case of the impact of the rule of law on democratic institutions. 
Again, as we mentioned before, our methodology seems to be capturing the positive 
feedback between the quality of economic and political institutions. The main difference 
here is that in contrast to the case with democracy, openness improves the rule of law. 
The latter estimates are positive and significant in the first split, and just positive when 
the geography split is used.  Putting these results together with the ones from the 
democracy equation we conclude that openness is working through institutions in two 
different ways. Countries that are more open tend to acquire better economic institutions, 
perhaps because this is required to better compete internationally. However, openness in 
general tends to weaken democratic institutions, perhaps because openness exacerbates 
distributional conflicts. This result also may help resolve some of the different findings 
found in the literature. If only one of the two institutions is included in an OLS equation 
for income, then the bias on the openness coefficient can go in either direction 
(considering that both institutions have positive impact on income).  
 
Distance to the equator has a positive and significant effect on the quality of rule 
of law. In the case of the geography split this effect is large economically speaking. 
Regarding population and area, the message seems to be that larger countries seem to 
have worse quality of the rule of law, although the overall effect is small. 
 
The openness equation reveals that the most important determinant of the degree 
of openness is income and geography. The level of income per capita has a positive 
impact on the degree of openness when the colony split is used, but it is insignificant in 
the other specification. Better democratic institutions or rule of law have a negligible   19
impact on openness. Distance from the equator, area, and population have negative and 
significant effects on the degree of openness. Bigger countries are in general less open, 
and the closer they are to the equator the larger the share of trade. 
 
One of the advantages of our procedure is that we can perform a variance 
decomposition, and determine the relative importance of each of the shocks. Given the 
estimates of matrix A, the structural residuals can be computed and the unconditional 
variance can be estimated from the sample: 
 
  () ( ) AX var var = ε  
 
The diagonal of this matrix is an estimate of the unconditional variance of the structural 
shocks. Given that variance we can compute the contribution of each shock to the 
variance of the observed variables. Denote 
 
  () [ ] ij b A inv B = =  
 
the elements of the inverse of A, and denote as  y σ ,  idem σ ,  irol σ ,  open σ ,  DistEa σ ,  area σ , and 
pop σ  the unconditional variances of the structural residuals. Then the variance of variable 
i (let us say income) is given  
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In this variance decomposition we are already assuming that the structural shocks 
are uncorrelated. In Table 7 we show the variance decomposition implied by the colony 
split, and in Table 8 we present the variance decomposition when the geography split is 
used. 
 
Table 7: Variance decomposition: Colony split 
  Y  Idem Irol Open  DistEq  Area Pop 
Income  58.1%  8.1% 1.1% 9.9% 20.1%  2.2% 0.4% 
Democracy  1.2% 73.3%  4.1% 10.2%  8.0% 3.2% 0.0% 
Rule of Law  9.6% 23.6%  43.4%  0.0% 22.4%  0.7% 0.2% 
Openness  8.2% 0.9% 0.0% 33.3%  3.7% 36.8%  17.1% 
 
Table 8: Variance decomposition: Geographical orientation split 
  Y  Idem Irol Open  DistEq  Area Pop 
Income  38.6% 0.8% 31.3% 0.3% 21.4% 6.6%  0.9% 
Democracy  0.4%  66.9%  5.4% 5.1% 17.4% 1.4% 3.5% 
Rule of Law  0.4% 0.5%  49.8%  1.2% 44.3% 3.1% 0.7% 
Openness  0.0% 0.0% 0.1%  43.7% 0.9% 27.1%  28.1% 
 
The interpretation of these results is as follows. Again, let us concentrate equation 
by equation. In the income equation, innovations to income uncorrelated with the any of   20
the other residuals explain 58 and 39 percent of the variance depending on the 
specification. In other words, geography and institutions explain roughly 40 to 60 percent 
of the income variation we observe today. The two measures of institutions contribute 
from 9 to 32 percent of the variation of income while distance to the equator explains a 
little more than 20 percent. Indeed, all the geographic variables together explain less than 
30 percent of the variation. 
 
Regarding democratic institutions 70 percent of the variation is unexplained – or 
explained by own innovations. Rule of law explains only 5 percent of the variation, while 
openness explains a little more (almost 10 percent in the colony split). Distance to the 
equator has a larger effect, while area and population explain almost nothing.  
 
Rule of law, on the other hand, is much better explained by the explanatory 
variables. Democracy and distance from the equator explain more than 40 percent of the 
variation, while area, population and income explain an additional 10 percent.  
 
Finally, openness is also well explained by the explanatory variables. Only 33 to 
43 percent of the variation is explained by innovations to openness alone. Interestingly, 
income and institutions have small explanatory power on openness and it is the 






The results we presented have been subjected to several sensitivity tests. First, we 
have substituted the variable “constraints on the executive” for democracy without major 
changes in the results.  Second, we have also tried several definitions for rule of law. 
When we use the rule of law measures from Political Risk Services (Knack and Keefer 
1995) averaged for the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, the results are almost identical. 
Third, we tried several standard measures of openness.  When openness from the Penn 
World Tables is used (instead of the WDI measure) the estimates become less significant 
but the signs remain the same as those presented here. Finally, we also modified the 
definition of colonization including as “colonized” those countries where there was any 
presence of Europeans. The results are almost identical. Therefore, our findings are 
generally robust to redefinitions of the variables, exclusion of some countries, and 
changes in the split. The general message (signs and significance of the relationship) 
survived this sensitivity exercise. 
 
IV.2 Testing the model 
 
Even though the model is overidentified and therefore we can either test the 
overidentification or allow some coefficients to change across the sub-sample, it is 
important to understand that not all coefficients are overidentified.  
   21
In particular, the overidentified coefficients in our model are those in the distance 
from the equator, area, and population equations (the exogenous variables); the other 
coefficients are just identified. Consequently, our test of overidentification is confined to 
evaluating the stability of the coefficients in the equations for the exogenous variables.  
We did not reject the overidentifying restrictions for these equations.  But it is important 
to recognize the limitation of this result.  This just states that the coefficients in the 
exogenous variables equations–how much area and population are explaining distance 
from the equator and vice-versa–are stable, and not that the coefficients of interest are 
stable. 
 
An interesting exercise would be to expand the splits used in this paper to achieve 
overidentification of all the endogenous interactions and determine if the coefficients are 
different across sub-samples. This can be achieved if the data is a panel, for example, and 
we use decades as different splits. Unfortunately, in this paper, the assumption that the 
coefficients in the four equations of interest are stable across the samples has to remain a 
maintained assumption.  
 
IV.3 OLS versus IV 
 
The IV literature estimating the impact of institutions on income usually finds that 
the coefficient is larger than the OLS estimate. There are several potential explanations 
for this. First, there may be large errors-in-variables and settler mortality can be 
instrumenting for it. Second, the feedback from income to institutions could be negative. 
Third, the instrument may be invalid in that it belongs in the income equation. The results 
we have presented help resolve this ambiguity.   
 
First, we find that the feedback is in general positive—as the standard intuition 
would suggest. Richer countries in general can afford better institutions. We also find that 
variables that are highly correlated with settler mortality—such as distance to the 
equator–enter the income equation, suggesting that part of the upward bias in the IV 
estimates could be the result of the instrument not being entirely valid.  
 
Finally, there is the question of whether IH can deal directly with the errors-in-
variables in the data. The model that we have presented relies on the assumption that 
heteroskedasticity exists in the data, and that this heteroskedasticity is the outcome of 
differences in the variances of the structural shocks. As a result, the methodology can 
deal with errors in variables if we can assume that the variance of the errors-in-variables’ 
shock remains unchanged across the splits. In other words, we have to assume that the 
change in the variance that is observed across sub-samples still is due to a shift in the 
structural variances and not to the fact that some sub-sample has a larger error-in-
variables than the other. This implies that to deal with errors-in-variables we require a 
somewhat strong assumption. If the split would have been performed by separating 
developed and developing economies it is clear that this assumption would have been 
wrong. But our splits are based on geographical alignment and according to whether 
countries were colonized or not. Therefore, developed and developing economies are   22
both represented in the sub-samples.
7 Thus, this assumption could perhaps be justified. 
Consequently, the fact that we can deal with some form of errors in variables is a major 
advantage of our procedure. By contrast, the IV literature assumes that the instrument is 






The approach we have taken here serves as a useful robustness check on a large, 
important, and influential body of research on the determinants of income differences 
across countries.  It also allows us to probe further on the interrelationships among the 
endogenous variables than the IV literature has been able to do.  Some of our results 
reinforce findings that have already been reported: most importantly, we find a strong 
causal impact from economic institutions (rule of law) to incomes.  Others are novel: one 
of our most intriguing results is the strong negative effect of trade openness on 
democracy.  Yet other results weigh in on one side of prevailing controversies: for 
example, our findings on the impact of openness on incomes are in line with papers that 
have reported negative or insignificant results (e.g. RST) and contradict papers with 
positive results (e.g., FR).  
 
  In closing, we emphasize the need to subject the IH approach itself to further 
robustness checks.  As we indicated above, it would be useful to come up with plausible 
alternative splits and to be able to test for coefficient stability across sub-samples directly.   
 
                                                 
7 Some of the poorer countries in the world, namely Ethiopia and Afghanistan, have never been colonized. 
8 The error in variables is equivalent to a common shock and the relaxation of the assumption that the 
structural shocks have zero covariance. To solve the problem of identification we were to need additional 
regimes. See Rigobon and Sack (2003b) for a model in which the zero covariance of the structural shocks is 
relaxed. See also Hogan and Rigobon (2002).   23
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Appendix 
Colony Dummy 
Not Colonized    Colonized 
Afghanistan Liberia    Algeria  Kiribati 
Albania Libya    Angola  Lao  PDR 
American Samoa  Liechtenstein    Antigua and Barbuda  Lesotho 
Andorra Lithuania    Argentina  Macao,  China 
Armenia Luxembourg    Aruba  Madagascar 
Austria Macedonia,  FYR    Australia  Malawi 
Azerbaijan  Marshall Islands    Bahamas, The  Malaysia 
Bahrain Micronesia,  Fed.  Sts.    Bangladesh  Maldives 
Belarus Moldova    Barbados  Mali 
Belgium Monaco    Belize  Malta 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Mongolia   Benin  Mauritania 
Bulgaria Netherlands    Bermuda Mauritius 
Channel Islands  Northern Mariana Islands    Bhutan  Mayotte 
China Norway    Bolivia  Mexico 
Croatia Oman    Botswana  Morocco 
Cyprus Palau    Brazil  Mozambique 
Czech Republic  Poland    Brunei  Myanmar 
Denmark Portugal    Burkina  Faso  Namibia 
Eritrea Qatar    Burundi  Nepal 
Estonia Romania    Cambodia  Netherlands  Antilles 
Ethiopia  Russian Federation    Cameroon  New Caledonia 
Faeroe Islands  Samoa    Canada  New Zealand 
Finland  San Marino    Cape Verde  Nicaragua 
France  Saudi Arabia    Cayman Islands  Niger 
Georgia  Slovak Republic    Central African Republic  Nigeria 
Germany Slovenia    Chad  Pakistan 
Greece Spain    Chile  Panama 
Hungary Sweden    Colombia  Papua  New  Guinea 
Iceland Switzerland    Comoros  Paraguay 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Syrian Arab Republic    Congo, Dem. Rep.  Peru 
Iraq Taiwan    Congo,  Rep.  Philippines 
Ireland  Tajikistan    Costa Rica  Puerto Rico 
Isle of Man  Thailand    Cote d'Ivoire  Reunion 
Israel Tonga    Cuba Rwanda 
Italy  Turkey    Djibouti  Sao Tome and Principe 
Japan Turkmenistan    Dominica  Senegal 
Jordan Ukraine    Dominican Republic  Seychelles 
Kazakhstan United  Arab  Emirates   Ecuador  Sierra  Leone 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  United Kingdom    Egypt, Arab Rep.  Singapore 
Korea, Rep.  Uzbekistan    El Salvador  Solomon Islands 
Kuwait Vanuatu    Equatorial  Guinea  Somalia 
Kyrgyz Republic  Virgin Islands (U.S.)    Fiji  South Africa 
Latvia  West Bank and Gaza    French Polynesia  Sri Lanka 
Lebanon Serbia/Montenegro    Gabon  St. Kitts and Nevis 
      Gambia, The  St. Lucia 
    Ghana  St.  Vincent and the Grenadines 
    Greenland  Sudan 
    Grenada  Suriname 
    Guam  Swaziland   27
    Guatemala  Tanzania 
    Guinea  Togo 
      Guinea-Bissau  Trinidad and Tobago 
    Guyana  Tunisia 
    Haiti  Uganda 
    Honduras  United  States 
      Hong Kong, China  Uruguay 
    India  Venezuela,  RB 
    Indonesia  Vietnam 
    Jamaica  Yemen,  Rep. 
    Kenya  Zambia 
     Z i m b a b w e  
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Geographical Orientation 
Horizontal Vertical 
Andorra Korea,  Rep.  Aruba  Algeria 
Afghanistan Kuwait  Angola  Ecuador 
Albania  Lao PDR  Netherlands Antilles  Eritrea 
United Arab Emirates  Lebanon  Argentina  Ethiopia 
Armenia  Liechtenstein  Antigua and Barbuda  Gabon 
Australia Sri  Lanka  Burundi  Ghana 
Austria Lithuania  Benin  Guinea 
Azerbaijan  Luxembourg  Burkina Faso  Gambia, The 
Belgium Latvia  Bahamas,  The  Guinea-Bissau 
Bangladesh Macao,  China  Belize Equatorial  Guinea 
Bulgaria Monaco Bermuda Grenada 
Bahrain Moldova  Bolivia  Guatemala 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Maldives  Brazil  Guyana 
Belarus Macedonia,  FYR  Barbados  Honduras 
Brunei Myanmar  Botswana  Haiti 
Bhutan Mongolia  Central  African Republic  Jamaica 
Switzerland Malaysia  Canada  Kenya 
Channel Islands  Netherlands  Chile  St. Kitts and Nevis 
China Norway  Cote  d'Ivoire  Liberia 
Cyprus Nepal  Cameroon  Libya 
Czech Republic  New Zealand  Congo, Rep.  St. Lucia 
Germany Oman  Colombia Lesotho 
Denmark Pakistan Comoros  Morocco 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Philippines  Cape Verde  Madagascar 
Spain  Papua New Guinea  Costa Rica  Mexico 
Estonia Poland Cuba  Mali 
Finland  Korea, Dem. Rep.  Cayman Islands  Malta 
France Portugal  Djibouti  Mozambique 
Faeroe Islands  Qatar  Dominica  Mauritania 
United Kingdom  Romania  Dominican Republic   
Georgia Russian  Federation     
Greece Saudi  Arabia     
Greenland Singapore    
Hong Kong, China  San Marino     
Croatia Slovak  Republic     
Hungary Slovenia    
Indonesia Sweden     
Isle of Man  Syrian Arab Republic     
India Thailand     
Ireland Tajikistan     
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Turkmenistan     
Iraq Turkey     
Iceland Taiwan     
Israel Ukraine     
Italy Uzbekistan     
Jordan Vietnam     
Japan  West Bank and Gaza     
Kazakhstan Yemen,  Rep.     
Kyrgyz Republic  Cambodia   
 